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Abstract 
General medical practices’ in Australia are vulnerable to information security threats and insecure practices. It 
is becoming well accepted in the healthcare environment that information security is both a technical and a 
human endeavour, and that the human behaviours, particularly around integration with healthcare workflow, 
are key barriers to good information security practice. This paper develops a holistic capability approach to 
information security by completing a preliminary iteration of mapping operational capabilities to governance 
capabilities. Using an operational backup capability matrix exemplar, the approach is analysed against the 
governance policy capability matrix. The resultant mapping between the operational and governance capability 
frameworks demonstrates that resilience can be promoted through sound governance. This implies that 
improved security performance and compliance contributes to measurement and oversight of the governance 
processes thereby making the organisations demonstrably more resilient to security threats. This paper 
proposes the need for a holistic capability approach to information security.  
Keywords 
Information security, operational capability, governance capability, performance improvement. 
INTRODUCTION 
General medical practices, as the primary point of care, need to ensure that the healthcare information they 
collect, is secure. It is becoming well accepted in the healthcare environment that information security is both a 
technical and a human endeavour, and that the human behaviours, particularly around integration with 
healthcare workflow, are key barriers to good information security practice (Mahncke & Williams, 2011). The 
Ponemon Institute survey (2011) found that healthcare is one of the most breached industries. Healthcare 
information is becoming more lucrative to thieves as it could contain sensitive information, financial data and 
other identifying data that could be used for identity theft or on sold (Allen, 2012; Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse, 2011). Securing healthcare information is becoming significantly important in the developing 
electronic healthcare environment. 
General practices are becoming more cognizant of their responsibilities in the information security area, as is 
evident by bodies such as the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners (RACGP) who, in 2011 
published the Computer and Information Security Standards for General Practices’. Further, technical best 
practice standards and guidelines needed to secure information, are well documented by international standards, 
professional bodies, and best practice guidance from national and government agencies (International Standards 
Organisation (ISO); General Practice Computing Group (GPCG); Department of Health and Ageing; National 
E-Health Transition Authority (NEHTA); ISACA’s CobiT 5 (2012); The IT Governance Institute (ITGI); 
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST); Committee of Sponsoring organisations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO); and Hertzog’s OSSTMM 3). The operational aspects of a security capability approach are 
supported in various ways including frameworks such as that developed in 2007 by Williams. Williams’ (2007) 
information security operational capabilities for general practices addresses the implementation and 
measurement of security practices and provides a framework for incremental improvement in day to day 
security practices.  
Once operational policies and procedures have been implemented within practices, then the future management, 
or governance, of the information systems can be addressed. The governance component is arguably the most 
important, yet difficult to straightforwardly define and implement. Many organisations and indeed, even security 
professionals do not fully comprehend the relationship between governance and security programs (Harris, 
2006). Whilst a security program must address the threat profile, it must also address the legal and jurisdictional 
requirements in relation to the organisational objectives and drivers. However, there are different interpretations 
of security measures needed in light of the roles and relationships that staff have to others in the healthcare 
environment, both colleagues and patients. There is no single security solution; instead, a multi-layered best 
 2 
 
practice security strategy is required which includes operational, technical and governance guidelines and 
controls. Each of these components is integral to a holistic approach to effective information security 
protections, and must also address the ethical concerns present in the healthcare environment.  
This paper proposes the mapping of operational capability to governance capability and the creation of the 
Mahncke-Williams Capability Framework. The performance measurement for this model is presented together 
with a worked example to verify the model.  
 
Operational capabilities 
Operational capability is defined as “the quality of possessing attributes, physical or mental, required for 
performance or accomplishment, and the competency is possession of the suitable or sufficient knowledge, 
experience or skill” (Williams 2008). An operational framework presents activities in simple non-technical 
terms, which is imperative as security becomes a necessary aspect of day-to-day pervasive computing, utilised 
by non-IT users. From the healthcare information security systems perspective this has been defined as covering 
ten key process areas of security: access, vulnerability management, perimeter controls, content filtering, 
encryption, backup, malware, physical, security management and reporting, and wireless and mobile.  
Figure 1 shows the flow of influence from the bottom level of operational dependencies to the top level of 
governance an understanding of how the operational dependencies co-exist and influence the governance level 
and its activities is required. 
                         
Figure 1: Flow of operationally dependent activities as a contribution to governance 
 
At the base level, the capabilities of the staff to undertake and integrate security controls in healthcare, 
particularly primary care, have been shown to be poor (Williams, 2011). In the healthcare environment an 
elemental problem is the capabilities of those who need to implement security in their day to day activities. This 
in essence includes all people using information systems and anyone handling or responsible for healthcare 
information. It should be remembered that information security is not a core activity for healthcare and it is 
unreasonable to assume that staff are able to apply security measures consistently without effective integration 
into workflow (Snidaro & Foresti, 2007). Operational capability involves both education and awareness and 
context aware security controls. Practical security controls defined as clear and simply distinct tasks can provide 
a firm and measurable foundation upon which to base effective security. In addition, they provide a supporting 
path to measure the governance process.  
   
Based originally on the Capability Maturity Model representations, Williams (2008) Operational Capabilities 
Framework comprises four elements:  
1. Maturity levels.  These provide a structured template for persistent improvement.   
2. Key process areas and their associated goals.  A key process area is a set of related activities that can 
achieve the stated goal of a key process area.  The goals are important in that they provide a measure of 
the capability of the practice and maturity level reached.  
3. Common operational features.  These are characteristics which define the key process area contributing 
to the overall goals. They are used as a metric upon which comparison to maturity levels is made. The 
features are policy, standards, process, procedures, training and tools. Table 1 explains the relationship 
between these common operational features. 
4. Key practices. A key process area is defined by the procedures, activities and communications 
implemented as follows: 
 
Policy Laws and regulations that govern and constrain operations 
Standards Accepted criteria for operation 
Governance 
requirements
Tactical capabilities
Dependent operational activites
Flow
 of influence   
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Constrain 
Process Activities used to conform to standards in accordance with policy 
Implemented by 
Procedures Instructions on how to implement an activity or process 
Supported by 
Training Identification of knowledge or training needed to use a procedure 
Tools Identification of automated support to implement a procedure 
Table 1: Operational Common Features (adapted from University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, n.d.) 
The construction of the relevant information security operational capabilities have been applied (RACGP, 2011) 
and have been published by Williams.  The important contributions that operational capabilities provide are to 
underpin the governance requirements.   
 
Governance capabilities 
It is this governance component of information security that is currently problematic and mainly unaddressed 
within General Practice at the organisational and the wider national and state-wide levels. Information security 
governance is defined as:  
“the process of establishing and maintaining a framework and supporting 
management structure and processes to provide assurance that information 
security strategies are aligned with and support business objectives, are 
consistent with applicable laws and regulations through adherence to policies 
and internal controls, and provide assignment of responsibility, all in an effort 
to manage risk”(NIST 800-100). 
The International Standards organisation’s (ISO), ISO/IEC DIS 27014 Information technology – Security 
techniques - Governance of information security (DIS) standard, is yet to be released. 
Developing information security governance processes requires planning and knowledge. The information 
security governance capabilities extend the research and publications conducted by the RACPG. Further, 
interpreting and applying ISACA’s CobiT 5 (2012); International Standards Organisation’s ISO/IEC 27001, 
27002 (2005), ISO 27799-2008 and ISO/IEC DIS 27014 (Draft); The IT Governance Institute (ITGI); National 
Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) Security Metrics Guide for Information Technology Systems - 
Special Publication 800-55 (2008); Hertzog’s OSSTMM 3 (2010); Committee of Sponsoring organisations of 
the Treadway Commission (COSO) (2005); IsecT (2012); ISM3 (2007); Department of Health’s Clinical 
Governance Standards for Western Australian Health Services (2005); U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services - OCR HIPAA (2012); and William’s TIGS-CMM (2007a). The resultant information security 
governance capability matrix comprises of thirty three governance control activities. An example of a 
governance control activity for Policy Coverage is provided in Table 2.  
 
1.3 Policies 
1.3.1  Policy coverage 
Initial 
 
Information 
security policies are 
verbal, undefined 
and/or ad hoc.  
Managed 
 
Internal best practice 
policies are 
documented and are 
repeatable for all key 
operational activities 
in accordance with 
the RACGP 
computer security 
guidelines 3rd edition.  
Defined 
 
Policies and 
procedures are 
defined and conform 
to relevant 
legislation, RACGP 
regulations and 
accreditation 
requirements. 
 
Policies have been 
approved and are 
signed off on by 
management.  
Quantitatively 
Managed 
Number of 
implemented 
policies measured 
as a percentage of 
required policies in 
accordance with the 
RACGP Standards.  
 
Optimising 
 
External best 
practice policies are 
applied (ISO/IEC 
27002/ISO/IEC 
27799) that extend 
those required 
within the sector. 
Table 2: Example of a governance control activity 
 
The governance control activities are logically divided into three main areas, that of Accountability, Governance 
Planning and Resource Management. A section of the Governance Capabilities matrix, Strategic Alignment, 
was published by Mahncke and Williams in 2011. Preliminary verification of the governance capabilities has 
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been conducted during two focus group interviews, comprising of both security experts and medical 
practitioners.  
 
MAHNCKE-WILLIAMS CAPABILITY FRAMEWORK 
The Mahncke-Williams Capability Framework (Capability Framework) has been developed as an information 
security process improvement instrument for use within general medical practice and associates the ten 
operational capability matrices and the governance capability matrix. The resultant Capability Framework is 
graphically demonstrated in Figure 2. Each of the ten operational capabilities matrices from the operational 
capabilities (Williams, 2008), are accessed against the governance capability matrix. A general practice 
implements the Capabilities Framework by firstly completing, or mapping their performance, against the ten 
operational matrices.  
 
 
                    Information Security Governance Capabilities (Mahncke & Williams, 2011) 
 
                  
                          
                                                                                  Governance Review Process 
 
Information Security Operational Capabilities (Williams, 2008) 
                   
Figure 2: Mahncke-Williams Capability Framework 
 
Following which, the practice similarly maps their governance performance based on the operational outcomes. 
Mapping the general practices operational and governance security performance establishes a security 
performance measure, or baseline, against which the practice can aim for incremental and sustainable 
improvement.  
Accountability
1: Strategic 
Alignment
2: Compliance
3: Policies
Governance Planning
4: Risk 
Management
5: Incident 
Response 
Management
6: Business 
Continuity 
Management
Resource Management
7: Asset 
Management
8: People 
Management
9: Information 
Management
10: Financial 
Management
A: Physical B: Access Control C: Backup D: Malware
E: Intrustion 
Detection
F: Vulnerability 
Management
G: Perimeter 
Controls
H: Content 
Filtering
I: Encryption J: Wireless and Mobile
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Measuring capability 
The Capability Framework presented utilises the Software Engineering Institute’s (2012) Capability Maturity 
Model® (CMM) and Capability Maturity Model® Integration (CMMI) approaches to measure information 
security performance improvement within general medical practice. This approach aims for systematic 
improvement in capabilities to demonstrate attainment of higher levels of capability maturity (Software 
Engineering Institute, 2009; Williams, 2007b). Maturity models provide an organisation with the ability to 
baseline their current capability, outline proposed strategies and to measure security progress over time (Poole, 
2006). This maturity model approach is increasingly becoming evident in IT governance with reporting based 
on the COBIT Security Baseline guidance which allows organisations to establish the minimum security 
requirements in line with the IOS/IEC 27002 standards (Poole, 2006). 
There are five capability maturity model CMM and CMMI levels as defined by the Software Engineering 
Institute (2009), ISM3 (2007) and Williams (2008) as demonstrated in Table 2. For each control activity, or 
‘row’ in the operational and governance capability frameworks, the practice selects the appropriate minimum 
level applicable to the practices’ performance from the range 1-5 (Initial to Optimised). The practice cannot 
move to a higher maturity level without having fulfilled all the conditions of the lower levels (CobiT 4.1, 2004). 
By selecting a level for each control activity in the Capabilities Framework, a performance measure of that 
activity is established.  
 
Maturity Level Focus: 
Operational Capability Maturity Model (CMM) Levels 
1 Initial  
 
Best practices are 
followed and 
automated 
2 Repeatable 
 
Processes are 
monitored and 
measured 
3 Defined  
 
Processes are 
documented and 
communicated 
4 Managed  
 
Processes follow a 
regular pattern 
5 Optimizing  
 
Processes are ad 
hoc and 
disorganised 
Governance Capability Maturity (CMMI) Levels 
Level 1 
Initial 
 
Processes 
unpredictable, 
poorly controlled 
and reactive 
Level 2  
Managed 
 
Processes are 
monitored and 
controlled in 
accordance with 
policy 
Level 3 
Defined 
 
Defined 
processes 
characterised by 
continuity, 
incident 
resolution and 
prevention. 
Processes are 
proactive 
Level 4 
Quantitatively 
Managed 
Processes are 
measured and 
controlled for 
quality and 
performance 
Level 5 
Optimising 
 
Processes are 
continually 
improved based on 
a quantitative 
understanding of 
the practice’s 
objectives 
Table 2: Description of capability maturity levels applicable to operational and governance capability 
 
At the first iteration, a performance level is assigned for each activity within the Capability Framework, thus an 
information security governance baseline is established. The practice should aim for incremental performance 
improvement from the established baseline to a higher level until the Level 3 – Defined measure, or above, has 
been achieved for each information security control activity in the Capability Framework.   
The measurement outcome, i.e. the levels attained, is a governance capability summary which identifies 
governance competence (Beveridge, 2008). Further, a maturity model can be “used as a benchmark for 
comparison and as an aid to understanding” (Software Engineering Institute, 2009). For example, a comparative 
assessment can be undertaken of different practices where the information security governance capabilities are 
the common basis for comparison. This could assist in defining an industry standard. 
 
Verification of the Capability Framework 
A verification exemplar is the mapping of the operational backup capability matrix (Williams, 2008) to the 
governance capability matrix. The governance capability matrix is used to review backup by assessing the 
backup matrix against it. The six operational common features of the backup matrix are mapped to the 
governance capabilities as follows: The four operational common features that of Policy, standards, processes 
and procedures can be mapped to Accountability in the governance capability matrix; Training maps to People 
Management within Resource Management, and tools maps to Asset and/or Information Management. The 
performance measure levels of the six common operational features are passed up into the governance 
capabilities for review. 
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                Figure 3: Governance review process 
 
Questions are asked such as, are there any new developments that would necessitate the backup matrix to be 
updated, such as backing up to the cloud. If so, best practice processes and procedures are added to the backup 
policy and the backup matrix is updated accordingly. Next, the effectiveness of the backup policy is assessed. 
There are fourteen control activities in the backup matrix; each of which has been assigned a baseline CMM 
performance level. Each activity is assessed, and those with the lowest performance level are identified as in 
need of improvement. The practice then assign a performance level to the corresponding governance control 
activity.  
Governance planning will further assess backup Risk Management, Incident Response Management and 
Business Continuity Management. Similarly, each of the governance activities map back to monitor and review 
the operational capabilities. If updates or changes are necessary within the backup matrix, then these are 
actioned accordingly. In a similarly manner, each of the remaining operational capability matrices are assessed 
at the governance level. In this manner, all operational and governance activities are assessed. It is anticipated 
that general practices’ would need to organise three governance review meetings per annum, comprising of a 
minimum of three members of staff, including one member of staff from ICT.   
DISCUSSION 
Theoretically, at a governance review meeting the operational capability performance will be assessed by 
mapping them to the governance capabilities to determine if activity controls are below the required Level 3 
performance. The governance meeting will need to assess all aspects of backup against the governance areas of 
Accountability, Governance Planning and Resource Management. For example, Business Continuity in regards 
to backup must be assessed. The governance control activity for Business Continuity as relates to backup is 
assessed. CMM performance level/s are assigned as appropriate. In this way the governance meeting decides if 
the practice backup governance performance needs improvement. If so, control activities from the governance 
activities are allocated to appropriate staff to action by the next meeting.  
Subsequently,  if a security breach occurs, for example it is discovered that the backup has not been encrypted 
prior to being taken off site for storage, then this incident is discussed at the governance meeting and the reasons 
for the breach ascertained, such as were staff too busy or is there a need for additional training on encryption 
processes. The governance meeting would refer to the governance capability criteria and review what actions 
are needed. Do procedures need to be changed? Could a better process be implemented, have the best practice 
activities been altered? If changes are required, then these changes are made to both the operational capabilities 
and governance capabilities as required. The meeting continues to review any other incidents.  
If the governance meeting find it justified to adjust activities up a level, then this performance improvement 
measure is discussed and processes put in place to drive this. In this way continuous security feedback is 
achieved. The practice maps its performance against the original baseline to determine performance 
improvements. Has the practice improved since the last governance meeting? If not, the meeting focused on the 
lowest performing control activities and allocated the activity/activities to an appropriate staff member for 
actioning and review at the next governance meeting. 
The purpose of focusing on the future management of security is to enter into a discussion of where the practice 
is at in terms of its aspirations to improve its information security practices.  It may be that the practice desires 
to reach a high level of security in a certain timescale, and so a regular item at a governance meeting would be 
to track progress against that goal. 
Operational 
Capabilities
Performance 
Measures
Governance 
Capabilities
Monitor and 
Review
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The resultant mapping between the operational and governance capability frameworks demonstrates that 
resilience can be promoted through sound governance. This implies that improved security performance and 
compliance contributes to measurement and oversight of the governance processes thereby making the 
organisations demonstrably more resilient to security threats. This paper proposes the need for a holistic 
capability approach to information security.  
CONCLUSION 
The use of the Capability Framework, which incorporates both the operational capabilities and governance 
capabilities, enables general practice to review their information security practices and establish policies and 
procedures to help meet their legal obligations, and if necessary, move the practice to a higher level of 
compliance. Due to the flexibility of the two frameworks (operational and governance), they can be customised 
to reflect the practices’ specific situation, objectives and priorities.  
The aim of the capabilities is to promote performance improvement in information security practice within 
general medical practice. This practical information security Capability Framework aims to assists practices’ in 
establishing an information security governance baseline from which improvement in information security 
performance can be measured. The element of continuous improvement in governance, driven and supported by 
improvement in operational capability, is important as the capabilities should take into account breaches, 
weaknesses or failures which then become opportunities for improvement in the future. 
It is the task of the governance review meeting to re-affirm or otherwise, the practices security governance 
performance and if necessary explore any implications for accountability, resource management and governance 
planning. Empowering staff with the supporting mechanisms to perform information security responsibilities, 
forms the basis of information security governance capability. Further, the Capability Framework could be 
implemented more broadly within the healthcare community, where the extrapolated methodology may 
similarly apply.   
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